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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TAXATION-FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS *-Taxpayer, a Texas ranch-
er, had operated a cattle business in partnership with a non-
family member. During the latter part of 1939, the partnership
was dissolved upon the condition that the taxpayer, Culbertson,
would sell an undivided one-half interest in the herd to his four
sons. The sons gave their father an interest-bearing note for
one-half interest in the new partnership. This note was paid in
the following manner: credit for overcharge $5,930; gifts from
taxpayer $21,744; and one-half of a loan procured by the new
partnership, Culbertson & Sons, $30,000. The loan was repaid
from the proceeds from the operation of the ranch. The oldest son
performed services for the partnership until he entered the army.
The second son went into the army directly from college and
rendered no services to the partnership. The two younger sons
went to school during the winter and worked on the ranch during
the summer.
The tax court, applying the dual test of "original capital"
and "vital additional services" disallowed any division of income
and held the entire income of the partnership taxable to the
father.' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, reversing
the tax court, recognized the partnership tax wise, for the court
found that the partnership was formed "with the full expecta-
tion and purpose that the boys would, in the future, contribute
their time and services to the partnership. ' 2 The Supreme Court
disagreed with the tax court and the court of appeals and re-
manded the case to the tax court to determine which, if any, of
taxpayer's sons were partners with him in the operation of the
ranch during the taxable years involved, 1940 and 1941. Com-
missioner v. Culbertson, 69 S.Ct. 1210 (U.S. 1949).
The remand was based on the query as to which of the sons,
if any, "was there a bona fide intent that they be partners in
the conduct of the cattle business, either because of services to
be performed during those years, or because of contributions of
capital of which they were the true owners."'8
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for a divided court,4
* See Prentice Hall Tax Service I1 70,515 (1949) for a tabulation of family
partnership cases decided since the Culbertson case.
1. T.C. Memo. Decision Docket Nos. 4184, 4185 (1947).
2. Culbertson v. Commissioner, 168 F.(2d) 979 (C.C.A. 5th, 1948).
03. 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1217 (U.S. 1949).
4. Although Black and Rutledge, J.J., concurred, they expressed the
view that the tax court properly applied the principles of the Tower and
Lusthaus decisions. Burton, J., concurred, stating that there was nothing as
a matter of law that would preclude the tax court from finding that the
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asserted that the true test of a valid partnership for tax pur-
poses is intent-whether "the parties in good faith and acting
with a business purpose intended to join together in the pres-
ent conduct of the enterprise."5 Although the Tower and Lust-
hauS7 cases were affirmed, the Supreme Court criticized the tax
court for emphasizing the dual test of "original capital" and
"vital services" and omitting any consideration of "management
and control." "The question is not whether the services or cap-
ital contributed by a partner are of sufficient importance to meet
some objective standard supposedly established by the Tower
case, but whether, considering all the facts-the agreement, the
conduct of the parties in execution of its provisions, their state-
ments, the testimony of disinterested persons, the relationship
of the parties, their respective abilities and capital contributions,
the actual control of income and the purposes for which it is
used, and any other facts throwing light on their true intent-
the parties in good faith and acting with a business purpose
intended to join together in the present conduct of the enter-
prise." The Supreme Court then pointed out that the tax court
never made "even an oblique reference to any lack of intent on
the part of respondent and his sons to combine their capital
and services 'for the 13urpose of carrying on the business.'"
The court relied on the Tower case to overthrow the posi-
tion of the court of appeals. "If it is conceded that some of the
partners contributed neither capital nor services to the partner-
ship during the tax years in question, as the court of appeals was
apparently willing to do in the present case, it can hardly be
contended that they are in any way responsible for the produc-
tion of income during those years. . . . our decision in Commis-
sioner v. Tower clearly indicates the importance of participation
in the business by the partners during the tax year. We there
said that a partnership is created 'when persons join together
their money, goods, labor, or skill for the purpose of carrying
income was properly taxable on a partnership basis. Frankfurter, J., con-
curred in a separate opinion, making more explicit the appropriate legal
criteria of a partnership for income tax purposes. Jackson, J., dissented,
taking the view that the ordinary common law tests of validity of partner-
ships are the tests for tax purposes and that they were met in this case.
5. 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1214 (1949). Cf. approach taken (in theory) by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue in 1947. I.T. 3845, 1947-1 Cum. Bull. 66.
6. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532, 90 L.Ed. 670, 164
A.L.R. 1135 (1946).
7. Commissioner v. Lusthaus, 327 U.S. 293, 66 S.Ct. 539, 90 L.Ed. 679
(1946).
8. 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1214 (U.S. 1949).
9. Id. at 1215.
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on a trade, profession or business and where there is community
of interest in the profits and losses.' ",a It should be noted that
this language is couched in terms of a present contribution of
capital or services. To hold otherwise would be a violation of
the fundamental principle that income must be taxed to him
who earns it."
The Culbertson case makes it clear that in order for a part-
nership to be recognized tax wise, the partners must contribute
either capital or services; nevertheless the requisite capital may
have been acquired by gift-even where the gift was in connec-
tion with the creation of the partnership. 2 However the opinion
warns that transactions between members of a family will be
carefully scrutinized since "the family relationship often makes
it possible for one to shift tax incidence by surface changes of
ownership without disturbing in the least his dominion and con-
trol over the subject of the gift or the purposes for which the
income from the property is used.' 3 How is the taxpayer going
to prove that the gift was not a mere "camouflage"? The court
indicated the answer, stating, "If the donee of property who then
invests it in the family partnership exercises dominion and con-
trol over that property-and through that control influences the
conduct of the partnership and the disp6sition of its income-
he may well be a true partner. Whether or not he is free to and
does, enjoy the fruits of the partnership is strongly indicative of
the reality of his participation in the enterprise."'1 4 Apparently,
a donee will not be allowed to delegate his control over the
donated property, even though it is generally considered that
a donee who delegates managerial powers to another, but re-
tains the right to revoke or limit those powers at any time, is
still the true owner. A more practical test would be whether the
donee has the right to exercise control, rather than the actual
exercise of it.' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
had some difficulty in the application of the Culbertson case.
10. Id. at 1213.
11. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S.Ct. 241, 74 L.Ed. 731 (1930); Helver-
ing v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554, 84 L.Ed. 788 (1940). Cf. Poe v.
Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58, 75 L.Ed. 239 (1930).
12. Walsh v. Commissioner, 170 F.(2d) 535 (C.C.A. 8th, 1948). But see
Cole v. Commissioner, 173 F.(2d) 893 (C.C.A. 6th, 1949).
13. 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1216 (U.S. 1949). In Edward A. Theurkauf, 13 T.C. No.
70 (1949), the tax court sustained the validity of a partnership where the
facts were similar to those in the Tower case, the distinguishing feature
being that there was no condition attached to the gift.
14. Id. at 1217.
15. Cf. Henson v. Commissioner, 174 F.(2d) 846 (C.C.A. 5th, 1949).
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In a recent case it held the income of a partnership taxable to
the donor's parents, stating that there was no showing that any-
one but the father controlled the capital used in production of
the income.' 6 After argument on rehearing, the original opinion
was vacated and the case was remanded to the district court.
Ironically, the court which started the trend towards the "intent"
test 17 said very little about intent in its original opinion of the
Ginsburg case.
Prior to the Tower case, a "donee partner" rendering no
services could be sustained only if capital was a substantial in-
come-producing factor.' 8 This rule will probably hold true under
the Culbertson decision. Where the income is primarily attribu-
table to capital, the question of services should be immaterial.
An interesting problem is presented when the income of the
partnership is attributable to both capital and services. Should
a reapportionment be required when one partner contributes
capital only? This question was raised in the instant case, but
the court "intimated no opinion on that subject."' 9 The tax
court has reallocated income in such cases but this action has
found disapproval by the courts of appeal.20 A probable safe-
guard against a reallocation by the commissioner would be a
provision in the partnership agreement for a reasonable salary
for the working partner before the division of profits according
to capital invested.
It may well be that the Culbertson case is the beginning of
a new era in family partnerships and it is hoped that the Bureau
of Internal Revenue and the tax court will not again go astray
in interpreting the leading decision on the problem. Although
16. Ginsburg v. Arnold, 176 F.(2d) 879 (C.C.A. 5th, 1949), wherein Waller,
J., the author of the majority opinion of the Gulbertson case in the court of
appeals, dissented. But see 0. H. Delchamps, 13 T.C. No. 39 (1949), where
the partnership was upheld where donee partners performed insignificant
services.
17. Culbertson v. Commissioner, 168 F.(2d) 979 (C.C.A. 5th, 1948); Walsh
v. Commissioner, 170 F.(2d) 535 (C.C.A. 8th, 1948); Isaac Blumberg, 11
T.C. 663 (1948).
18. Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944); J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C. 799(1944); Davis B. Thornton, 5 T.C. 116 (1945).
19. 69 S.Ct. 1210, 1217.
20. Canfield v. Commissioner, 168 F.(2d) 907 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948). In Woos-
ley v. Commissioner, 168 F.(2d) 330, 333 (C.C.A. 6th, 1948), the court said,
"In our judgment the Tax Court clearly erred as a matter of law in attrib-
uting to the capital contributions all of the income earned by the partner-
ship and in making the allocation which it did contrary to the express pro-
visions of the articles of partnership." Hartz v. Commissioner, 170 F.(2d)
313 (C.C.A. 8th, 1948), cert. denied 69 S.Ct. 1528 (U.S. 1949).
1949]
100 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VoL. X
the Revenue Act of 194821 makes the partnership question be-
tween spouses principally an academic one, it is still important
as between other family members. The latter type of partner-
ship has a far greater chance of recognition tax wise, for "it has
been aptly said that 'bed chamber arrangements' between a
husband and wife will be viewed with suspicion."
22
SIDNEY A. CHAMPAGNE
21. 62 Stat. 110 (1948).
22. Laikin, Tax Pitfalls (1947) 25 Taxes 657.
